Online appendix of "Searching for the Reference Point"

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1 Description of the online appendix

In section 6.4 of the paper, we describe the robustness checks that we performed, varying the utility and weighting functions and the model specification. Table 6 of the paper describes the various specifications and is recalled below.

Model	Choice-specific reference point		Prospect-specific reference point	
	Consumption utility	Probability weghting	Consumption utility	Probability weghting
1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
4	No	Yes	Yes	No
5	Yes	No	Yes	No
6	No	No	Yes	No

Table 1: Considered Models

Model 1 is our benchmark model, in which probability weighting and consumption utility are present for all reference point rules. Section 2 reports the results we obtained for this model, and are described in detail in the paper. Sections 3 to 5 report the results obtained with the same specification as Model 1 but with parametric variations:

- Exponential utility on log scale[1]

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1-\alpha^x}{1-\alpha} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 1 \\ x & \text{if } \alpha = 1 \end{cases}$$

- Prelec's two-parameter weighting function $w(p) = exp(-\gamma_2(-ln(p))^{\gamma_1})$,
- *IBeta* weighting function $w(p) = \frac{\int_0^p t^{\gamma_1-1}\,(1-t)^{\gamma_2-1}\,\mathrm{d}t.}{\int_0^1 t^{\gamma_1-1}\,(1-t)^{\gamma_2-1}\,\mathrm{d}t}$ is the cumulative distribution function of the Beta probability distribution. An illustration of the possible shapes of this family is provided in Appendix B of the main text.

Sections 6 to 8 report the results obtained for Models 2, 3, and 4 (with power utility and Prelec's one-parameter weighting function as in the benchmark model). The results of Models 5 and 6 (no weighting function) were unstable and are therefore not reported.

Each section describes one model and consists of two subsections. The first subsection describes the behavioral parameters, starting with the behavioral population-level parameters. The first figure represents the posterior densities of the population parameters. A table reports their point estimates, which can be compared with those displayed in Figures 6 and 7 in the paper and with Table 3. For comparison with the main text we also report the estimates for Subject 17 with the equivalent of Figure 8.

The second subsection reports the results for the reference points. The first figure is the equivalent of Figure 3 in the paper. It is followed by a table that is the equivalent of Table

[1] This is a re-parameterization of standard normalised exponential utility:

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1-exp(\beta * x)}{1-exp(\beta)} & \text{if } \beta \neq 0 \\ x & \text{if } \beta = 0 \end{cases}$$

where the original parameter $\beta \in (-\infty, +\infty)$ is parameterized as $\beta = log(\alpha)$ with $\alpha \in (0, +\infty)$. Such parameterization has a benefit of uniform interpretation of power and exponential utility parameters, and allows keeping the same probabilistic specification of the hierarchical model across the two families.

2. The second figure is the equivalent of Figure 4 in the paper. A table follows which can be compared with the data of Figure 5 in the paper. The last table is the equivalent of Table 4 in the paper.

Section 9 displays the instructions of the experiment. Section 10 lists the 70 choices subjects had to make.

2 Model 1: Benchmark

2.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 1: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.48	0.22
γ	0.43	0.59
λ	2.34	2.69
ξ	12.85	8.46

Table 2: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 2: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.46	0.21
γ	0.15	0.14
λ	0.84	0.84
ξ	7.03	3.55

Table 3: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

2.2 Reference Points



Figure 3: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.30	0.06
MaxMin	0.30	0.06
MinMax	0.10	0.04
X at Max P	0.01	0.02
Expected Value	0.06	0.04
Prospect Itself	0.20	0.06

Table 4: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 4: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	43
MaxMin	33
MinMax	10
X at Max P	0
Expected Value	2
Prospect Itself	19

Table 5: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ	λ	ξ	Nr
MinMax	0.40	0.15	0.50	14.34	10
Status Quo	0.42	0.28	1.51	11.75	43
MaxMin	0.46	0.24	2.24	10.30	33
Expected Value	0.36	0.25	2.44	6.14	2
Prospect Itself	0.45	0.16	2.23	10.89	19
other	0.50	0.25	1.36	10.06	32
ALL	0.44	0.24	1.59	10.89	139

Table 6: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

The previous table is Table 4 in the paper.

Table 7: EU test for individuals sharply classified as using Status Quo rule. Confidence level 0.05%

	γ			
	< 1	1	> 1	Sum
α				
< 1	28	9	0	37
1	3	3	0	6
> 1	0	0	0	0
Sum	31	12	0	43

3 Model 1 with Exponential Utility

3.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 5: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.62	21.05
γ	0.51	0.80
λ	3.81	9.40
ξ	13.25	26.80

Table 8: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 6: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.02	11.58
γ	0.17	0.32
λ	0.78	7.35
ξ	3.10	3.12

Table 9: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

3.2 Reference Points



Figure 7: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.34	0.06
MaxMin	0.28	0.07
MinMax	0.11	0.04
X at Max P	0.03	0.03
Expected Value	0.08	0.05
Prospect Itself	0.13	0.05

Table 10: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 8: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	45
MaxMin	30
MinMax	10
X at Max P	0
Expected Value	3
Prospect Itself	7

Table 11: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ	λ	ξ	Nr
MinMax	0.01	0.16	0.38	11.30	10
Status Quo	0.02	0.29	1.51	9.81	45
MaxMin	0.02	0.23	2.70	8.12	30
Prospect Itself	0.01	0.17	5.96	4.91	7
Expected Value	0.01	1.07	2.28	12.26	3
other	0.03	0.24	1.39	6.48	44
ALL	0.02	0.26	1.68	8.31	139

Table 12: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

4 Model 1 with Prelec's Two-Parameter Weighting Function

4.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 9: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.54	0.53
γ^1	0.57	0.92
γ^2	1.72	3.08
λ	5.86	15.23
ξ	13.67	29.72

Table 13: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 10: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.46	0.56
γ^1	0.22	0.87
γ^2	0.46	3.87
λ	1.04	15.48
ξ	2.56	2.90

Table 14: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

4.2 Reference Points



Figure 11: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.42	0.07
MaxMin	0.31	0.06
MinMax	0.05	0.03
X at Max P	0.05	0.03
Expected Value	0.02	0.02
Prospect Itself	0.13	0.05

Table 15: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 12: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	65
MaxMin	31
MinMax	3
X at Max P	3
Expected Value	0
Prospect Itself	8

Table 16: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ^1	γ^2	λ	ξ	Nr
Status Quo	0.39	0.28	1.17	1.99	10.92	65
MinMax	0.36	0.18	0.29	1.05	10.40	3
MaxMin	0.41	0.22	0.59	2.75	7.02	31
Prospect Itself	0.36	0.45	0.64	6.47	4.01	8
X at Max P	0.30	0.65	2.75	2.94	5.81	3
other	0.46	0.29	1.36	3.36	7.06	29
ALL	0.40	0.27	0.96	2.30	7.82	139

Table 17: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

5 Model 1 with *IBeta* Weighting Function

5.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 13: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.58	0.58
γ^1	0.96	2.50
γ^2	0.96	2.29
λ	5.39	12.47
ξ	11.76	24.89

Table 18: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 14: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.45	0.60
γ^1	0.17	2.12
γ^2	0.41	4.10
λ	1.01	9.51
ξ	2.17	2.42

Table 19: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

5.2 Reference Points



Figure 15: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.35	0.06
MaxMin	0.35	0.06
MinMax	0.07	0.04
X at Max P	0.08	0.04
Expected Value	0.01	0.02
Prospect Itself	0.12	0.04

Table 20: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 16: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	52
MaxMin	40
MinMax	3
X at Max P	6
Expected Value	0
Prospect Itself	8

Table 21: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ^1	γ^2	λ	ξ	Nr
Status Quo	0.39	0.46	0.26	1.96	9.75	52
MaxMin	0.44	0.19	0.33	2.88	5.58	40
X at Max P	0.40	1.15	0.41	4.64	5.85	6
Prospect Itself	0.35	0.14	0.54	4.83	5.26	8
MinMax	0.35	0.10	0.84	1.07	9.40	3
other	0.49	0.41	0.27	1.90	4.77	30
ALL	0.42	0.33	0.30	2.27	6.48	139

Table 22: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

6 Model 2

6.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 17: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.49	0.23
γ	0.57	0.50
λ	2.47	4.03
ξ	22.24	19.37

Table 23: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 18: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.50	0.29
γ	0.28	0.18
λ	0.80	2.17
ξ	8.24	4.33

Table 24: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

6.2 Reference Points



Figure 19: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.49	0.06
MaxMin	0.17	0.05
MinMax	0.06	0.03
X at Max P	0.01	0.01
Expected Value	0.04	0.03
Prospect Itself	0.22	0.06

Table 25: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 20: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	74
MaxMin	18
MinMax	4
X at Max P	0
Expected Value	0
Prospect Itself	21

Table 26: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ	λ	ξ	Nr
Prospect Itself	0.46	0.35	0.73	18.68	21
Status Quo	0.43	0.47	1.36	19.38	74
MinMax	0.43	0.25	0.56	22.56	4
MaxMin	0.44	0.37	1.96	15.04	18
other	0.50	0.50	1.58	10.80	22
ALL	0.46	0.46	1.41	16.54	139

Table 27: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

7 Model 3

7.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 21: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.50	0.19
γ	0.37	0.89
λ	2.08	1.97
ξ	11.70	7.45

Table 28: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 22: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.48	0.20
γ	0.08	0.11
λ	0.94	1.02
ξ	5.90	2.46

Table 29: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

7.2 Reference Points



Figure 23: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.25	0.06
MaxMin	0.44	0.06
MinMax	0.15	0.04
X at Max P	0.02	0.02
Expected Value	0.02	0.01
Prospect Itself	0.10	0.04

Table 30: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 24: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	29
MaxMin	61
MinMax	17
X at Max P	0
Expected Value	1
Prospect Itself	9

Table 31: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ	λ	ξ	Nr
MinMax	0.45	0.09	0.66	10.86	17
Status Quo	0.47	0.20	1.50	10.36	29
MaxMin	0.49	0.11	2.12	10.12	61
Prospect Itself	0.46	0.25	2.06	10.21	9
Expected Value	0.52	0.15	2.21	9.72	1
other	0.51	0.20	1.46	7.26	22
ALL	0.48	0.15	1.56	10.11	139

Table 32: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

8 Model 4

8.1 Behavioral Parameters



Figure 25: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters in population.

	μ	σ
α	0.52	0.24
γ	0.51	0.52
λ	2.19	2.81
ξ	21.12	18.97

Table 33: Posterior point estimates of behavioral parameters in population: α - exponent of power utility, γ - parameter of Prelec weighting function, λ - loss aversion.



Figure 26: Posterior densities of behavioral parameters for subject 17 (B_{17})

	Median	SD
α	0.56	0.30
γ	0.24	0.16
λ	0.76	1.57
ξ	7.87	4.35

Table 34: Posterior summaries for subject 17.

8.2 Reference Points



Figure 27: Posterior densities for RP rules in population

	Median	SD
Status Quo	0.49	0.07
MaxMin	0.25	0.06
MinMax	0.12	0.04
X at Max P	0.02	0.02
Expected Value	0.01	0.01
Prospect Itself	0.09	0.04

Table 35: Point estimates of RP mixture in population.



Figure 28: Posterior probability of a selection of subjects using a particular model

	Nr
Status Quo	74
MaxMin	26
MinMax	12
X at Max P	0
Expected Value	1
Prospect Itself	6

Table 36: Sharp predictions. Number of subjects for which the posterior probability of the respective reference point is higher than 0.5.

	α	γ	λ	ξ	Nr
Status Quo	0.45	0.42	1.43	19.52	74
Prospect Itself	0.43	0.47	1.90	13.18	6
MinMax	0.54	0.25	0.56	17.31	12
MaxMin	0.49	0.30	2.29	14.28	26
Expected Value	0.51	0.39	2.00	12.61	1
other	0.56	0.59	0.94	11.58	20
ALL	0.48	0.39	1.44	15.37	139

Table 37: Median individual level parameters for each sharply clasified group.

9 Instructions (translated from Romanian)

9.1 Screen 1 (log in)

Welcome to the Taking Decisions under Risk experiment.

Please log in with your ID and read carefully the instructions that follow.

9.2 Screen 2 (Questions)

The experiment consists of 70 questions. Each question consists of two risky options. A typical question is presented below.



In this example, the first option offers a gain of 300 Lei with probability of 55%, and a gain of 405 Lei with probability of 45%. The second option offers the gains 135 Lei, 240 Lei and 555 Lei with the corresponding probabilities 10%, 55% and 35%.

The width of colored segments is proportional to the corresponding events probability. The intensity of the color of each segment is proportional to corresponding events gain.

For each question, you will be asked to choose the option you preferred by clicking on the radio button displayed at the left-hand side of the option. In the above example, the second option was chosen.

At the end of the experiment, one of your choices may be played for real (the details of the payment mechanism are given on the next slide).

9.3 Screen 3 (Payment)

Each participant of the experiment will be given a fixed participation fee of 50 Lei.

Each participant will be given a one in three (1/3) chance of one of his/her options to be played for real. The 1/3 chance is determined by a selection of a green ball out of 3 balls (1 green + 2 white) from a closed urn.

If the participant extracted the green ball, a number from 1 to 70 will be extracted randomly and the lottery chosen by the participant at that question will be played for real (the procedure of random extraction of the number between 1 and 70 will be explained below).

Next a number from 1 to 100 is extracted by the participant. This number will determine uniquely the participants outcome. The following example illustrates the correspondence between the random number in 1-100 and the value of the gain.

A hypothetical example:

Suppose the participant (Sanda) extracted the green ball and is now eligible for the random payment.

Now, suppose the extracted question is Question 34 (see the attached image), and the two digit number extracted by Sanda is 82, as the picture below indicates. During the experiment, Sanda chose Option 1 for this question. The gain corresponding to Option 1 and random number 82 is 510 Lei.



Obviously, this procedure generates outcomes with the same probabilities as indicated in the chosen option. The larger the number extracted, the bigger the gain.

Random Number Extraction Procedure

The extraction procedure for question numbers from 1 to 70 and winning number from 1 to 100 follows similar rules. Let us take the second case for illustration.

Firstly, the participant is asked to extract two balls: one from each of two separate urns. The first urn contains balls with numbers ranging from 0 to 9 and represents tens in a two digit number. The second urn contains balls with numbers from 1 to 10 and represents units in a two digit number. The final number is computed with the formula N1*10+N2. For example if N1 is 3 and N1 Is 2 then the corresponding two digit number is 32, if the numbers are 0 and 9 then the final number is 9; if the numbers are 7 and 10 then the two digit number is 80. By the above procedure, any number from 1 to 100 can be extracted randomly and uniformly.

The same mechanism is used for questions number extraction. The only difference is that the first urn contains only numbers ranging from 0 to 6.

9.4 Screen 4)

[Start Button]

Good Luck!

10 List of Choices

Subjects had to make 70 choices between two prospects A and B with

$$\begin{aligned} A =& (p1a, x1a; p2a, x2a; p3a, x3a; p4a, x4a) \text{ and} \\ B =& (p1b, x1b; p2b, x2b; p3b, x3b; p4b, x4b) \ . \end{aligned}$$

All values are given below.

Choice	x1a	x2a	x3a	x4a	p1a	p2a	p3a	p4a	x1b	x2b	x3b	x4b	p1b	p2b	p3b	p4b
1	267	313	453	546	0.1	0.8	0.05	0.05	127	220	406		0.15	0.05	0.8	
2	159	221	408		0.7	0.1	0.2		34	97	346		0.1	0.3	0.6	
3	183	233	384	485	0.7	0.05	0.1	0.15	32	132	334		0.15	0.05	0.8	
4	223	263	383		0.4	0.5	0.1		143	183	343		0.1	0.4	0.5	
5	127	255	287		0.7	0.05	0.25		95	191	223		0.15	0.05	0.8	
6	103	213	377		0.6	0.15	0.25		48	158	267	322	0.3	0.1	0.05	0.55
7	92	245			0.85	0.15			16	130	206		0.1	0.7	0.2	
8	135	290	329		0.55	0.35	0.1		96	213	251		0.25	0.05	0.7	
9	209	309	459		0.35	0.55	0.1		159	259	359	409	0.05	0.55	0.1	0.3
10	221	504			0.85	0.15			80	292	434		0.05	0.7	0.25	
11	64	188	313		0.4	0.1	0.5		2	126	251	375	0.25	0.4	0.1	0.25
12	122	270	418		0.15	0.8	0.05		48	196	344	492	0.1	0.35	0.45	0.1
13	224	416			0.55	0.45			95	352	480		0.25	0.7	0.05	
14	100	211			0.2	0.8			64	137	285		0.2	0.5	0.3	
15	257	427			0.8	0.2			143	370	484		0.35	0.45	0.2	
16	223	416			0.45	0.55			159	287	544		0.05	0.7	0.25	
17	219	448			0.2	0.8			143	296	372	601	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.1
18	99	225			0.8	0.2			16	141	183	266	0.1	0.4	0.45	0.05
19	94	187			0.3	0.7			64	125	156	248	0.25	0.3	0.05	0.4
20	203	317			0.75	0.25			127	241	279	354	0.35	0.05	0.45	0.15
21	138	245			0.55	0.45			30	84	191	352	0.05	0.05	0.85	0.05
22	118	200			0.8	0.2			64	91	173	228	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.1
23	232	374			0.4	0.6			91	161	303	515	0.05	0.1	0.6	0.25
24	233	344			0.7	0.3			159	196	307	381	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4
25	251	358			0.7	0.3			143	304	412	465	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.05
26	105	278			0.25	0.75			48	163	336	394	0.25	0.4	0.1	0.25
27	183	302			0.6	0.4			64	242	361	421	0.15	0.7	0.1	0.05
28	61	179			0.45	0.55			22	101	218	257	0.4	0.05	0.5	0.05
29	147	367			0.6	0.4			0	74	367		0.25	0.05	0.7	
30	99	251			0.6	0.4			48	251			0.4	0.6		
31	259	558			0.75	0.25			159	359	558		0.15	0.7	0.15	
32	168	397			0.6	0.4			16	92	397		0.05	0.4	0.55	
33	209	407			0.75	0.25			143	407			0.5	0.5		
34	120	243			0.75	0.25			80	161	243		0.15	0.7	0.15	
35	142	209	277		0.7	0.05	0.25		74	108	277		0.4	0.1	0.5	
36	151	230	348		0.5	0.15	0.35		111	269	348		0.25	0.6	0.15	
37	140	200	261		0.85	0.05	0.1		80	110	261		0.05	0.55	0.4	
38	79	170	308		0.25	0.7	0.05		33	216	308		0.15	0.8	0.05	
39	192	341			0.15	0.85			192	390	439		0.55	0.4	0.05	
40	15	290			0.3	0.7			15	382			0.5	0.5		
41	95	443			0.3	0.7			95	327	559		0.1	0.8	0.1	
42	102	311			0.15	0.85			102	381	450		0.55	0.25	0.2	
43	127	284			0.2	0.8			127	336			0.45	0.55		
44	54	259			0.3	0.7			54	191	328		0.05	0.85	0.1	
45	127	259	390		0.05	0.4	0.55		127	456	521		0.45	0.15	0.4	
46	57	221	331		0.3	0.1	0.6		57	167	386		0.1	0.6	0.3	
47	111	194	277		0.1	0.05	0.85		111	318	359		0.5	0.3	0.2	
48	6	229	377		0.05	0.8	0.15		6	155	451		0.1	0.7	0.2	
49	100				1				13	186			0.45	0.55		
50	224				1				12	294			0.25	0.75		
51	276				1				80	374	472		0.35	0.45	0.2	
52	203				1				106	154	299		0.45	0.05	0.5	
53	196				1				95	146	246	297	0.3	0.05	0.5	0.15
54	383				1				171	453			0.25	0.75		
55	297	404			0.55	0.45			189	243	350	511	0.05	0.05	0.85	0.05
56	220	338			0.45	0.55			181	260	377	416	0.4	0.05	0.5	0.05
57	238	329	467		0.25	0.7	0.05		192	375	467		0.15	0.8	0.05	
58	301	368	436		0.7	0.05	0.25		233	267	436		0.4	0.1	0.5	
59	259				1				172	345			0.45	0.55		
60	362				1				265	313	458		0.45	0.05	0.5	
61	213	418			0.3	0.7			213	350	487		0.05	0.85	0.1	
62	223	347	472		0.4	0.1	0.5		161	285	410	534	0.25	0.4	0.1	0.25
63	306	526			0.6	0.4			159	233	526		0.25	0.05	0.7	
64	251	358			0.7	0.3			143	304	412	465	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.05
65	95	443			0.3	0.7			95	327	559		0.1	0.8	0.1	
66	223	416			0.45	0.55			159	287	544		0.05	0.7	0.25	
67	209	407			0.75	0.25			143	407			0.5	0.5		
68	138	245			0.55	0.45			30	84	191	352	0.05	0.05	0.85	0.05
69	111	207	223		0.5	0.4	0.1		80	95	207		0.1	0.4	0.5	
70	111	175	207		0.1	0.4	0.5		80	159	191		0.25	0.25	0.5	